The Causal Effect of Education on Aggregate Income by Marcelo Soto
The causal eﬀect of education on aggregate income
Marcelo Soto∗
Instituto de Análisis Económico, Barcelona
September 2006
Abstract
Empirical studies ﬁnd that changes in schooling are not correlated with
changes in per capita income. Similarly, the estimation in levels also produces
minor coeﬃcients for years of schooling. Low social returns and measurement
error in educational variables have been invoked as possible explanations for
such ﬁndings. This paper shows that collinearity between physical and human
capital stocks seriously undermines the ability of educational indicators to dis-
play signiﬁcance in panel data estimates. On top of that, failure to cope with
endogeneity has produced biased estimates. As opposed to the earlier empiri-
cal literature, the social return on schooling is positive and signiﬁcant, but no
Lucas-type externalities are observed. Finally, the quality of education emerges
as a signiﬁcant determinant of heterogeneity in social returns across countries.
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A recurrent question that has characterised the debate on economic growth during the
last decade refers to the puzzling lack of correlation between years of schooling and
income per capita in empirical research. This evidence has led to diﬀerent examina-
tions and reinterpretations of the role of education. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) have
put forward that the level of education should not be seen as a factor of production,
but as a determinant of changes in total factor productivity. Also, in subsequent ver-
sions of an inﬂuential paper, Pritchett (2001) has argued that the poor institutional
framework, low quality and excess supply of schooling in developing countries are all
responsible for the lack of empirical link between changes in educational attainment
and economic growth. Cross-country evidence reported by Temple (2001) supports
the Pritchett hypothesis. Paralleling these results a series of panel data studies have
also failed to ﬁnd signiﬁcance of schooling in standard growth regressions (Bond,
Hoeﬄer and Temple, 2001; Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996; Islam 1995).
The purpose of this paper is to try to reconcile the macro evidence with the micro
ﬁndings on the returns to schooling. The paper argues that, although the Pritchett
hypothesis m a ya p p l yt os o m es p e c i ﬁc countries, it cannot explain the null or even
negative coeﬃcients for years of schooling. The causes of these ﬁndings must be found
somewhere else.
This is not a paper about why changes in the schooling variable cannot explain
per capita income growth between 1960 and a later date, as ﬁrst noted by Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994). This has already been addressed by Krueger and Lindahl (2001)
who single out measurement error in years of schooling as the central cause behind
this ﬁnding. Instead, the focus here is on how to compute reliable estimates of the
social return on schooling given the estimation problems found in the literature.In order to estimate the causal eﬀect of schooling there are basically three issues
that have to be considered. First, it must be deﬁned how years of schooling should
enter in a production function. The underlying question is how to relate the number
of years of schooling to human capital. Put simply, this is a discussion on whether the
macro-return to education should be evaluated in a log-log or log-linear formulation.
This question can be settled empirically and has already been addressed by Bils
and Klenow (2000). A second issue refers to the appropriate functional form to
be estimated. As is shown later, a simple statistical problem of collinearity between
physical and human capital stocks seriously undermines educational indicators’ ability
to display signiﬁcance in regressions in levels. The third point refers to the consistency
of the estimates. Empirical research has usually relied on ordinary least squares or
ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation and therefore has overlooked endogeneity problems. On top
of that, return heterogeneity in the macro return on schooling has been traditionally
ignored. These omissions have probably led to inconsistent estimates.
In part due to the econometric diﬃculties the literature has recently devoted more
attention to development accounting (Caselli, 2005; Hall and Jones 1999). This ap-
proach hinges on a proper estimation of the return on physical and human capital.
Although this paper is complementary to this literature, the estimated returns on
schooling are diﬀerent from those typically used in development accounting. In par-
ticular, richer countries tend to display higher social returns as a consequence of better
education quality.
Here the term ‘return’ calls for a clariﬁcation. In the same way as the micro Mincer
coeﬃcient from wage regressions cannot be interpreted as the internal rate of return
of education but as the causal eﬀect of schooling on wages (Card, 1999; Heckman,
Lochner and Petra, 2005), in this paper the macro Mincerian return is interpreted as
the eﬀect of schooling on GDP per head. So the terms ‘eﬀect of schooling’ or ‘returnon schooling’ will be used interchangeably.
As many authors have noted, the discussion on why education fails to display
positive eﬀects in growth regressions is more an academic issue than one pertinent
for policy decisions. The policy relevant question is whether schooling presents social
returns that are higher than the private ones. The paper oﬀe r sar a n g eo fv a l u e sf o r
the social return to years of schooling. Assuming return homogeneity the full sample
estimate of the income response to one additional year of schooling is around 8.0%.
This is in the range of micro-Mincerian returns reported by Psacharopoulos (1994)
and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) for country-level studies. The average social
return exceeds the standard private return found in micro studies only if physical
capital is assumed to respond to changes in human capital.
The average return hides substantial heterogeneity in the macro-Mincer coeﬃ-
cients across countries. Two additional results emerge from the data. First, the
macro Mincer coeﬃcients bear no relationship with the micro coeﬃcients reported by
Psacharopoulos. In particular, schooling has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on aggregate income
for the group of countries with the highest micro Mincer coeﬃcients. And second,
schooling has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on income in the group of countries with lowest
quality levels of education. In addition it is found that ignoring return heterogeneity
leads to a moderate overestimation of the average macro Mincer coeﬃcient.
In summary, contrary to the earlier ﬁndings, the causal eﬀect of education on
income is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. But on average the macro Mincer
coeﬃcients are not higher than the private ones. This last result is in line with the
ﬁndings of Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001),
Pritchett (2003) or Ciccone and Peri (2005), who following a diﬀerent (i.e. micro)
approach do not detect signiﬁcant externalities to schooling.
The paper is organised as follows: the next section discusses the main results andthe current debate about the macro-returns on schooling. This literature has given
attention essentially to the estimation in ﬁrst diﬀerences. From these estimates it has
been concluded implicitly that the level of schooling does not aﬀect the level of income
or that it is not possible to gauge the impact of schooling due to the low quality of the
data. Section 3 highlights the diﬃculties in estimating this return even in equations
in levels and presents new empirical results. Section 4 explores the eﬀects of return
heterogeneity across countries and assesses the eﬀects of quality of education. The
main conclusions are presented in section 5.
2 Earlier evidence
In order to evaluate the causal eﬀect of schooling on income the earlier literature has
focused almost exclusively on the estimation of cross country growth regressions. In
these regressions the income growth rate is regressed on enrollment rates or some
measure of the change in years of schooling. Since it is found that the variations of
schooling are not correlated with the changes of income, it has been inferred that
whether the level of schooling does not aﬀect the level of income or the data are too
noisy to provide conclusive evidence about the social returns on schooling. Although
the focus of this paper is not on the estimation in ﬁrst diﬀerences, it is important to
refer to this literature because it has determined the current conclusions regarding
the impact of schooling on aggregate income.
One of the ﬁrst attempts to assess the eﬀect of schooling in macro growth regres-
sions is done by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (MRW, 1992). There human capital is
represented as a factor of production in an extended version of the Solow model as
follows:Y = AKαHβL1−α−β (1)
Here Y represents total output, K and H are total physical and human capital re-
spectively, and L is the labour force. From equation (1) and standard laws of motion
for K and H, MRW show that both, the output level and growth may be related to
the investment rate in physical and human capital. These two equations represent, re-
spectively, the steady state and convergence path of income. Then, in their empirical
analysis, MRW show that human capital investment is signiﬁcant in both equations.
For human capital investment MRW use the secondary enrollment rate multiplied by
the fraction of population aged 15 to 19 in the working age population.
The empirical results of this inﬂuential paper are nevertheless shadowed by the
fact that MRW fail to control for the endogeneity of the investment rates and by
the murkiness of their measure of human capital investment. Examples of papers
that have tackled the endogeneity problem for testing the MRW model are Caselli,
Esquivel and Lefort (1996) and Islam (1995). In both papers the schooling variable
appears with the wrong sign.
The availability of data on both physical and human capital stocks has made possi-
ble the direct estimation of level-on-level or change-on-change regressions. Assuming
a linear function between years of schooling human capital, Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994) estimate
ˆ yi = ˆ Ai + αˆ ki + βˆ hi +  i (2)
where y = Y/L, k = K/L and h = average years of schooling for each country i and
ˆ g stands for the log change of variable g over the period 1965-1985.
As is well known, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) were the ﬁr s tt os h o wt h a ti n
regression (2) the change in schooling —whether measured by Kyriacou (1991) or
Barro and Lee (1993) data— provides non-signiﬁcant and sometimes even negativecoeﬃcients. On the other hand, they found that the level of schooling is positively,
though not always signiﬁcantly, correlated with growth. Undoubtedly, these results
were the ﬁrst to question empirically the view that human capital is to be treated as
an additional factor of production1.
In Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) the income growth rate is regressed on the change
in the logarithm of schooling. Later Pritchett (2001) replicates these regressions but
with a diﬀerent measure of human capital. Based on Mincer (1974) wage equations,
Pritchett builds a human capital index given by,
h = erS − 1 (3)
where h is human capital per worker, r is the return to education (which Pritchett
sets at 0.1)a n dS is the average number of years of schooling from Barro and Lee
(1993). He then uses OLS and instrumental variable methods to estimate regression
(2). As in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Pritchett ﬁnds a non-signiﬁcant β,i m p l y i n g
that changes in schooling have had no impact on economic growth. Furthermore, a
level regression for year 1985 also rejects the signiﬁcance of β. The interpretation of
this result is however radically diﬀerent from the one given by Benhabib and Spiegel.
Pritchett highlights the institutional characteristics where increases in education have
taken place and argues that: i) the education provided has low quality and so it has
not generated increases in human capital; ii) the expansion in supply of educated
labour has surpassed demand, leading to a decrease in the return of education; and
1The ﬁndings of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) produced an empirical literature that postulates a
growth-on-level formulation. This literature, which is not adressed in this paper, is well represented
by the informal growth regressions à la Barro. In these regressions the educational level is sometimes
seen as a state variable, i.e. a variable measuring the proximity to the steady state (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1995) and sometimes as a determinant of the steady-state itself (Barro, 1997). More
recently, Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) ﬁnd that primary school enrollment in 1960
is strongly correlated with growth during the period 1960 − 1996.iii) educated workers may have gone to privately lucrative but socially unproductive
activities.
However, even if all these phenomena are taking place simultaneously, they can
hardly be the reason behind the apparent lack of productivity of education in macro
empirical studies. First, it is diﬃcult to believe that the provision of education has
been of such a low quality in some countries that on average the world return is
zero. Moreover, as it is shown later, if countries with higher levels of schooling beneﬁt
from better quality and productivity of schooling, then standard cross-country regres-
sions would provide world average returns biased upwards. So an argument based on
diﬀerences in quality goes against the hypothesis of Pritchett (2001). Second, even
assuming that the supply of education has increased more rapidly than demand, this
cannot by itself imply that one additional year of schooling leads to a null increase
in production. And third, the hypothesis that most of the increases in education
have been devoted to socially unproductive activities around the world —which would
be necessary to explain a null global return— is simply at odds with reality: we do
observe that more educated people are employed in better-remunerated activities,
which themselves are registered in the national account systems. Again, this simple
observation does not mean that all skilled workers are devoted to socially productive
activities, but the opposite is not true either.
More recently, Temple (2001) has revisited Pritchett’s results. He has explored
the eﬀects of estimating the MRW production function (1) by assuming diﬀerent
deﬁnitions for human capital. With the same database as Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994), Temple estimates the following cross-country regressions:
∆lnYi = C0 + α∆lnKi + β∆f(Si)+γ∆lnLi + ∆εi (4)
where f(Si) is a function of the number of years of schooling. In particular, Templereports results for f(Si)=rSi and for f(S)=c0 +c1ln(Si)+c2(1/Si).N o n eo ft h e s e
yielded signiﬁcant coeﬃcients at standard levels. Temple concludes that “[...] the
aggregate evidence on education and growth, for large sample of countries, continues
to be clouded with uncertainty”.
The systematic failure of cross-country regressions to display positive eﬀects from
education has led to some researchers to question about the quality of the data on
education. Topel (1999) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001) argue that measurement
error in the number of years of schooling is a major cause of the apparent lack of
signiﬁcance of ∆S in growth regressions. In both papers the authors report panel
data results for the following equation for country i in year t:
∆lnyit = π1Sit−1 + π2∆Sit + π3 lnyit−1 + ∆τt + ∆εit (5)
where τt represents a time-speciﬁce ﬀect. The years of schooling variable is from Barro
and Lee (1993), which according to Krueger and Lindahl, has less measurement error
than Kyriacou’s (1991) data. Topel and Krueger and Lindahl estimate (5) by using
diﬀerent data frequencies. They ﬁnd that in high frequency regressions (i.e. panel data
with 5-year observations) ∆S is not signiﬁcant, while in lower frequency regressions
(10 or 20-year observations), ∆S becomes signiﬁcant. The authors argue that in short
periods of time ∆S has a low informational content relative to the measurement error
and this is why in 5-year data regressions the signiﬁcance of ∆S is rejected. In longer
periods of time, the argument goes, true changes in S are more likely to predominate
over measurement errors. Furthermore, Krueger and Lindahl show that if the estimate
of π2 (in the regressions with 20-year observations) is adjusted by taking into account
the downwards bias induced by the measurement error in S, its magnitude shoots from
0.18 to 0.30.T o p e l ﬁnds a non-adjusted π2 as high as 0.25 in a similar regression.
These values suggest huge returns to education, and if taken at face value, they wouldimply large positive externalities.
Yet, these ﬁndings must be considered with some caution for three reasons. First,
the regressions are not based on a speciﬁc growth model. The use of lagged income
suggests that equation (5) represents a convergence path towards steady state. But in
that case it is hard to justify the presence of both, the change and the level of schooling
simultaneously. Indeed, the MRW augmented model states that in a convergence path,
income growth depends on the investment rate of human capital (not on its level or
change).
Second, in almost all the regressions reported, the endogeneity of years of school-
ing is ignored. This variable is likely to be endogenous since as a country gets richer
it may aﬀord more investment in education, hence a higher level of education. Not
dealing with the endogeneity of S means that its coeﬃcient is likely to be biased
upwards. The few regressions reported by Krueger and Lindahl that were estimated
with instrumental variables methods make use of Kyriacou’s series as instruments (as
a solution to the measurement error problem). However, this instrument does not rep-
resent a solution to endogeneity since it is itself an endogenous variable. Krueger and
Lindahl argue that the attenuation bias introduced by measurement error is higher
than the upwards bias inherent to the endogeneity of S. But this argument, by it-
self, does not justify not using suitable instruments —like lagged values of endogenous
variables— to overcome the measurement error or endogeneity problems. A straight-
forward estimation method that deals with both sorts of biases looks as a much more
natural method of estimation.
A third reason to be cautious about these results is that ∆S is signiﬁcant only
when the change in the stock of physical capital is omitted from the regressions. When
Krueger and Lindahl include ∆ln(k), ∆S loses its explanatory power, while physical
capital growth gets a coeﬃcient as high as 0.8. This is much higher than the standardshare of physical capital in total income —which is thought to have a ceiling at around
0.5 (see Gollin, 2002)— and consequently is a clear sign of endogeneity problems.
Only when the coeﬃcient associated to ∆lnk is constrained to 0.35, ∆S recovers its
signiﬁcance. Krueger and Lindahl conclude that: “Overall, unless measurement error
problems in schooling are overcome, we doubt that cross-country growth equations that
control for capital growth will be very informative insofar as the beneﬁto fe d u c a t i o n
is concerned”.
To illustrate the eﬀects entailed in the omission of physical capital consider table
1. Columns 1 and 2 reproduces the estimates of equation (5) reported by Krueger
and Lindahl (2001) and Topel (1999) for the regressions based on 10-year observations
(over the period 1960-1990). Series for GDP per capita and per worker are from World
Penn Table Mark 5.6 and years of schooling are from Barro and Lee (1993). These
results show that both, the change and the initial level of years of schooling have a
positive eﬀect on economic growth. The diﬀerences in point estimates are due to the
diﬀerent methods of estimation. Krueger and Lindahl’s results are obtained by OLS,
while Topel uses the Within estimator.
From these results the authors conclude that schooling has a positive eﬀect on
growth although they acknowledge that the estimates may be biased due to the omis-
sion of physical capital and the presence of measurement error in schooling series.
The consequences of omitting physical capital are illustrated in the rest of the table.
Columns 3 and 4 replicate these regressions by using Cohen and Soto (2001) series on
years of schooling, for 83 countries2. The results are very close to those of Krueger and
Lindahl, whether GDP per capita or per worker is used. Namely, the coeﬃcients on
2Cohen and Soto (2001) show that their series of schooling have better reliability ratios than
Barro and Lee (1993 and 2001) series. The complete database on years of schooling and educational
attainment is available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/13/2669521.xlsyears of schooling are almost the same. This shows that at least in these regressions
the change of the series of schooling is not aﬀecting the results.
However, when the change in capital stock is included3 in column 5 the coeﬃcient
on the change in years of schooling falls dramatically and becomes insigniﬁcant. The
further inclusion of the initial level of physical capital stock causes the initial level
of schooling to lose its signiﬁc a n c ea sw e l l . O nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,t h el a r g ec o e ﬃcient
on physical capital reﬂects that endogeneity is biasing upwards this coeﬃcient. Yet,
endogeneity of physical capital by itself may not be the cause behind the vanishing
eﬀect of schooling. Moreover, if countries invest more on education as they become
richer, schooling would also be aﬀected by an upwards simultaneity bias.
Krueger and Lindahl argue that measurement error in S is exacerbated by the
inclusion of physical capital, hence the lack of signiﬁcance of schooling in the regression
with ∆lnk. However, the next section shows that even the estimation in levels —which
is less subject to measurement error problems— produces non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
for years of schooling. Therefore, something in addition to measurement error is
aﬀecting the estimation of the social return to schooling, unless Pritchett was right
in his assessment about the fact that education has not promoted economic growth
in the last decades.
The main message of the earlier evidence is that the social return on schooling
is low or not signiﬁcant or that the data available are too noisy to yield information
regarding the social returns on schooling. The next section provides new evidence in
the framework of a standard production function.
3Physical capital stocks are from Easterly-Levine (2001).3R e d i s c o v e r i n g e d u c a t i o n
The previous section highlights the diﬃculties that the earlier studies have found in
trying to estimate the social return on schooling from equations in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
A natural solution in order to gauge this return is to run regressions in levels or a
combination of levels and ﬁrst-diﬀerences. Assuming constant returns on K and H,
and setting lnh = rS 4, equation (1) yields the following equation:
lnyit = αlnkit +( 1− α)rSit + ηi + τt +  it, (6)
where ηi and τt are respectively country and time speciﬁce ﬀects, and  it is a residual.
The assumption of constant returns on K and H (i.e. α + β =1 ) allows the identi-
ﬁcation of r and has no implication on the results that are presented below. Indeed,
the social Mincerian return is the semi-elasticity of income with respect to years of
schooling. This can be estimated without any prior knowledge about factor shares in
total income. In all subsequent regressions the period covered is 1960-1990 and the
data are from PWT 5.6 in order to stick to the same income and growth data studied
in the earlier literature.
Table 2 reports estimates for α and (1 − α)r resulting from diﬀerent methods of
estimation. The ﬁrst column shows the OLS estimates for the equation in levels (6).
The physical capital variable is highly signiﬁcant and its estimated share in total in-
come is 0.60, larger than the ‘conventional wisdom’ about this variable. Conversely,
years of schooling are not signiﬁcant. Column 2 shows the results for the estimation of
equation (6) in ﬁrst-diﬀerences, which are similar to those obtained for the equation in
levels. Namely, years of schooling are not signiﬁcant, as earlier cross-country growth
regressions have already found5. As for the GMM estimates, none of them results in
4The original Mincerian equation also includes terms in labour experience and squared labour
experience, which is not taken into account here.
5Note that since estimation in ﬁrst-diﬀerences implies the lost of the ﬁrst observation, the resultsas i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcient for years of schooling6. The estimation in levels (regression 3),
which uses lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerences of the regressors as instruments, produces qualita-
tively similar results to the OLS estimates. What is more, the standard Arellano-Bond
estimator (column 4) provides a negative coeﬃcient —although not signiﬁcant— for ∆S
a n da ne x c e s s i v e l yh i g hα. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond and Wind-
meijer (2000) have shown that in ﬁnite samples the diﬀerence GMM estimator have a
large bias and low precision when the series have a strong autoregressive component.
This is certainly the case of the physical and human capital series. When the variables
are strongly autoregressive the authors show that the system GMM estimator, which
estimates simultaneously the equation in levels and in ﬁrst diﬀerences, provides more
precise estimates and lower biases in ﬁnite samples. Yet, the system GMM estimator
yields a non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for years of schooling (column 5).
The fact that none of the regressions that make use of instrumental variables pro-
duces signiﬁcant estimates for years of schooling suggest that the measurement error
problem is not the only reason causing insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. Another econometric
problem that may be behind this result is collinearity between physical capital stocks
and years of schooling. It is important to highlight that collinearity does not produce
biased estimates but imprecise ones. For instance according to the Blundell-Bond
estimation of table 2, when physical capital is included in the regressions the return
on schooling can be anything between −13.2% and 9.6% with a 95% conﬁdence level.
Collinearity between physical capital and schooling is a well known problem but it
has not been satisfactorily addressed before. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) omit phys-
are not directly comparable to those of column 1.
6The standard errors reported for GMM correspond to one-step estimates. Indeed, Blundell and
Bond (1998) and Blundell et al (2000) show that the two-step standard errors underestimate the
true variability of the coeﬃcients, and so the lead to under-rejection of non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
See Windmeijer (2000) for a correction of this problem.ical capital to be able to ﬁnd signiﬁcance for schooling, while Topel (1999) estimates
constrained equations by ﬁxing the coeﬃcient on k.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between years of schooling (S) and the logarithm
of physical capital per worker (k). The correlation between both variables is consid-
erable, as is shown by the large R2 obtained from an OLS regression of lnk on S
(without time dummies). An illustration that the high collinearity between physical
and human capital is undermining the precision of the estimates can be made by
regressing equation (6) without the physical capital variable. The results are shown
in panel B of table 2. There, all the methods of estimation —except for the diﬀer-
ence GMM estimator— result in signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for S. Even the equation in
diﬀerences, when estimated by OLS, provides a non-null coeﬃcient. Needless to say,
these results are subject to inconsistency problems due to the omission of physical
capital. This is patent from the implicit high return on schooling. But the fact that,
by omitting physical capital, years of schooling become highly signiﬁcant is a sign
that collinearity may be aﬀecting the precision of the estimation of equation (6) .
So why should collinearity aﬀect more human capital than physical capital? David-
son and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 181-186) suggest a simple procedure to ﬁnd out the
variable whose signiﬁc a n c ei sm o r ea ﬀected by the presence of collinearity. Suppose
that x1 and x2 are two collinear regressors and X represents the remaining regressors
of the model to be estimated. If an OLS regression of x1 on x2 and X produces a
higher R2 than a regression of x2 on x1 and X then it is the signiﬁcance of x1 in the
original model that will be more aﬀected. The reason is that in this case x1 is rela-
tively well explained by x2 and X. In the present context, if it is true that collinearity
is the cause of the low signiﬁcance of S, a regression of S on lnk and time dummies
should produce a higher R2 than a regression of lnk on S and time dummies. The
R2 of these two auxiliary regressions (not reported) are respectively 0.72 and 0.70.Although the diﬀerence is negligible it is consistent with the fact that physical capital
is signiﬁcant while human capital is not7.
One way to get rid of the collinearity problem is to reparametrise the model. By














where uit ≡ ηi + τt +  it.
The lower scatter in ﬁgure 1 represents the relationship between years of schooling
and the logarithm of the capital-output ratio. Although the correlation between
ln(k/y) and S is still high it is lower than correlation between lnk and S.
This reparametrisation introduces additional endogeneity problems as the income
level appears now in both sides of the equation. Although this is a common problem
in growth econometrics few studies try to deal with it seriously. For instance, every
convergence equation has the initial income level on both sides of the regression.
Similarly any regression that has the GDP growth rate as a dependent variable and
ratios like trade to GDP or ﬁnancial development to GDP have the same problem.
Only few studies recognize this by using instrumental variables, which is the proper
solution.
Topel (1999) has already estimated equation (7) by constraining the coeﬃcient
α to speciﬁc values (he chooses 0.35 and 0.5) or by assuming that the ratio k/y is
constant for each country over time. Under this last assumption he treats k/y as a
country speciﬁce ﬀect and estimates (7) by ﬁxed-eﬀect and OLS methods. Heckman
and Klenow (1997) also estimate a constrained version of (7) by OLS.
Table 3 presents unconstrained estimates for the equation (7). The OLS estimation
7Obviously this is just a qualitative result. There is no theory that indicates how large the
diﬀerence between the R2 of the auxiliary regressions must be to cause only one of the regressors to
lose its signiﬁcance. So we cannot say that the diﬀerence found here is "large" or "small".in levels (column 1) results in an implausible low coeﬃcient for the capital-output
ratio. Indeed, the implicit share of physical capital in total output is 0.221/1.221 =
0.181. This negative bias is the consequence of the presence of y in the capital-output
ratio, which is necessarily higher than the positive bias introduced by the presence
of k. By contrast, the coeﬃcient on schooling is large (21.7%) and highly signiﬁcant.
This value reﬂects the return on schooling that allows for physical capital to adjust
to changes in S so that the ratio k/y stays constant. Therefore it can be seen as
a long-term return on schooling. However the Mincerian-comparable return of one
additional year of schooling —i.e. the increase in income per worker that would be
obtained without an endogenous response of k—i s0.217 × (1 − 0.181) = 17.8%.T h i s
ﬁgure is still large and is in part due to the low coeﬃcient on the capital-output
ratio. Similar problems apply for the estimation in ﬁrst-diﬀerences (column 2), which
explains a negative α. Note however that by dealing with the collinearity problem, the
OLS estimations in both levels and in ﬁrst-diﬀerences produce positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients associated with years of schooling.
The GMM estimation in levels produces signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for both the capital-
output ratio and years of schooling (column 3). Not surprisingly the estimated share
of physical (46.4%) is higher than the one obtained in OLS estimation. This is slightly
larger than its typical value while the estimated social Mincerian return (8%) falls in
the range observed in micro studies. System GMM estimates display similar results.
The capital share is estimated at 46.2% and the semi-elasticity of income with respect
t oy e a r so fs c h o o l i n gi se q u a lt o8.3%.
These returns are larger than those reported by Topel (1999; table 2, column 5)
who, conditioning on a physical capital share of 35%, ﬁnds a marginal eﬀect of school-
ing equal to 5.5%. On the other hand, the results found here imply that the marginal
eﬀect of schooling at a macro level is slightly lower than the standard private returnobserved in labour studies. For instance, from around seventy country-level studies,
Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) report respectively
a world average Mincerian return equal to 10.1% and 9.7%.C o n s e q u e n t l y , i f m i -
cro returns are taken at face value, these results point to an absence of externalities
to schooling8. Moreover these preliminary results hint at the presence of signalling
and screening eﬀects of education. Under this hypothesis employers use education to
screen employees’ ability and so part of private the return on education is the value
o ft h es i g n a lt h a ti tc o n v e y s .T h e r e f o r et h e presence of screening implies that the pri-
vate return on schooling is higher than the aggregate return. Note however that the
diﬀerence between private and social returns is small (less than 2 percentage points)
and can be explained away by standard errors.
Finally, if an increase in the level of human capital induces an expansion of physical
capital the total macro return to schooling would be higher than the typical private
one. Indeed, under the assumption of a constant capital-output ratio the total return
to schooling would fall in the range 15%−15.5% depending on the method of estima-
tion. However, this larger long-term Mincerian return does not represent externalities
in the sense of Lucas (1988). In Lucas’s model, the social marginal product of hu-
man capital is higher than the private marginal return in the short-run —i.e. without
taking into consideration any hypothetical endogenous response of physical capital.
Therefore in order to analyse if these externalities exist in the real world we must
compare this short-run return with the typical micro Mincerian coeﬃcient. And the
results of table 3 point to the absence of this kind of externalities. On the other hand,
what table 3 does show is that, contrary to the ﬁndings of most of the recent empirical
literature, the neoclassical approach to human capital is strongly supported by the
8There is a huge literature on whether these micro returns are properly measured but this topic
goes far beyond the scope of this paper. The micro Mincer coeﬃcients are used only as a reference.evidence, and years of schooling present a return surprisingly close to the standard
value found in micro studies.
4 Return heterogeneity
The previous section assumes, consistently with most of the earlier literature, that the
macro return on schooling is the same across countries. However this assumption has
been questioned recently. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that
the social returns on schooling diﬀer across countries. On the theoretical ground, the
hypothesis that human capital has decreasing returns with the level of schooling has
been put forward by Bils and Klenow (2000). Similarly, Hall and Jones (1999) and
Caselli (2005) assume decreasing Mincerian returns to build human capital stocks for
their income accounting analyses.
The decreasing return hypothesis is in fact motivated by the private Mincerian
returns reported by Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002).
They report wide diﬀerences across world regions with, on average, richer and better
educated countries having lower private returns. However this is far from being a
perfect regularity and there are a number of exceptions. For instance, according to
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos the latest estimates for Japan and Singapore are respec-
tively 13.2% and 13.1% whereas those for South Africa and Egypt are respectively
4.1% and 5.5%. Although private and social Mincerian returns are not necessarily
connected, it is still possible that they are. If so, the observed heterogeneity in labour
studies would point to important diﬀerences in Mincerian returns at the aggregate
level.
Another piece of empirical evidence suggesting return heterogeneity is provided
by Hanushek and Kimko (2000). They report substantial diﬀerences in schoolingquality across countries —measured by test scores on mathematics and science. These
diﬀerences may also be a cause of return heterogeneity. Pritchett (2001) backs this
idea by arguing that the low quality of schooling is one major cause of the lack of
signiﬁcance of schooling variables in growth regressions9.
Under the presence of heterogeneity each country’s long-run return ri can be
expressed as:
ri =¯ r + νi (8)
where ¯ r is the world average return and νi is the country deviation from the world
average.
It is often stated that heterogeneity is not a problem in itself since the estimated
parameter can be interpreted as the average across countries, i.e. ¯ r . But, this
is not necessarily the case. In order to assess the eﬀects of return heterogeneity
it is convenient to illustrate its consequences for cross-section regressions. When
the income level is regressed on years of schooling a potential source of bias of the
estimated ¯ r emerges as the term νiSi is present in the residual of the equation. The
sign of the bias introduced by this term depends on whether νi and Si are positively or
negatively correlated. According to the micro evidence presented by Psacharopoulos
(1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) the return on years of schooling is
lower in countries with higher levels of education, so this would suggest that the
correlation σν,S between νi and Si is negative. This, in turn, would imply that
methods of estimation that do not account for diﬀerences in returns across countries
produce estimates of ¯ r biased downwards.
On the other hand, it may be the case that higher levels of schooling are not
9H o w e v e r ,a sn o t e db e f o r e ,i fb e t t e rq u a l i t yd o e sh a v ea ni m p a c to nt h er e t u r no ne d u c a t i o nt h e n
countries with higher levels of schooling (which are also those with better quality) should present
higher returns. This is contradicted by Psacharopoulos’s data.matched by higher aggregate productivity, especially in developing countries, as put
forward by Pritchett (2001, 2003). Moreover, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) highlight
that schooling quality diﬀers considerably among countries and in general it is lower in
the poorer and less educated ones. Therefore, since more educated countries beneﬁt
from higher schooling quality their ri should be relatively high. In that case σν,S
would be positive and the estimated ¯ r would be biased upwards. Of course this
reasoning neglects the endogeneity of S inherent in growth regressions, which also
bias the estimated ¯ r upwards. Note also that instrumental variable methods do not
solve the endogeneity problem introduced by heterogeneity since any instrument that
is correlated with Si is also correlated with νiSi.
To assess the eﬀects of heterogeneity in panel regressions let’s decompose country
i’s years of schooling into its sample average ¯ si and the deviation dit from the average
(i.e. Sit =¯ si + dit). Suppose that the return on schooling is given by (8). Then














Now the source of bias comes from the term vidit (the term vi¯ si is part of the
country’s speciﬁce ﬀect). Neglecting other possible sources of bias it can readily
be shown that the sign of the bias introduced by the presence of heterogeneity is





,w h e r eσ2
i is country i’s sample variance of years of
schooling. Therefore, if countries with lower (higher) than average returns have more
volatile levels of schooling then ¯ r will be estimated with a negative (positive) bias.
As before, the use of instruments does not solve the bias problem since any variable
correlated with Sit is also correlated with vidit. Conversely, if there is no correlation
between return and volatility of education, then return heterogeneity would not bias
the estimates of the average world return ¯ r. The appendix reports the observed σ2
ifor the countries in the sample.
A preliminary check of whether the heterogeneity in returns on schooling is biasing
the estimated average return consists in analysing the exogeneity of instruments used
in GMM estimation. The Sargan tests of table 3 reject the hypothesis of endogeneity
of the instruments, which suggests that heterogeneity is not introducing bias. However
the low p-values may be an indication that the instruments are in fact not exogenous.
4.1 Evidence from micro returns
An alternative way to deal with heterogeneity is to eliminate the source of bias by
explicitly accounting for the term viSit in the regressions. If private returns pi and
aggregate returns are somehow related, the excess private return may be a good proxy
for the excess macro return on schooling. In the absence of externalities to education
pi ≡ (1 − α)ri. Thus under this assumption vi w o u l db ee q u a lt ot h ee x c e s sp r i v a t e
return divided by (1 − α). But even if this extreme case does not apply, the private
returns may contain some information about the aggregate returns on schooling. This
suggests the use of micro evidence as a proxy for vi.
Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) report private
Mincerian coeﬃcients for several countries, which are shown in the appendix. The
average Mincerian coeﬃcient for the 55 common countries available is 10%,w h i c hi s
almost identical to the mean of all countries reported by Psacharopoulos. We can
check whether there is any relationship between the excess private return (deﬁned as
the private return minus 10%) and the variance of years of schooling in each country.
Figure 2 shows that there is no apparent link between both variables and in fact their
correlation is virtually equal to zero. Thus if the excess private returns calculated
here are a good proxy for the excess social returns, the ﬁgure suggests that in panel
regressions the presence of return heterogeneity does not introduce a signiﬁcant biasin the estimation of ¯ r.
Table 4 reports the regressions when private returns are used as proxies for so-
cial returns. The ﬁrst regression shows the estimation of (9) without accounting for
heterogeneity. This is the same regression as in table 3 but for the smaller sample
of 55 countries for which private Mincerian coeﬃcients are available. The results are
similar to those obtained with the full sample, although the Mincerian return falls to
7.2%. The low Sargan statistic hints at high heterogeneity among the countries in
this smaller sample. Regression 2 incorporates the excess private return multiplied by
schooling, which turns out to have a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Recall that
the expected coeﬃcient on this variable, assuming that private and social returns are
equal is 1/(1 − α).
These results show that the data reported by Psacharopoulos are a bad proxy for
excess social returns. There are at least two possible reasons for this. First, it may
be the case that private and social returns to education are unrelated, as claimed
by Pritchett (2003). This may be caused by educational screening and signaling
in the labour market, which aﬀects a worker’s salary but not his productivity. An
alternative explanation is that the returns reported by Psacharopoulos are too noisy.
An example of this is Jamaica, which has a micro-Mincerian return of 28.8% —or
4.5 standard deviations higher than the sample average. This is clearly an outlier
that may be having a non negligible eﬀect on the estimates of regression 2. Jamaica
is dropped from the sample in regression 3. The major eﬀect of this is the lost of
signiﬁcance of the excess private return. This is consistent with the fact that the high
return of Jamaica is distorting the previous estimates. However, the other results are
qualitatively the same as in regression 2. Namely, private returns still appear with
the opposite sign and the Sargan test is too low. Thus, in summary, these results
suggest that the excess private returns implicit in Psacharopoulos data are in fact abad proxy for excess social returns.
As an alternative way to exploit the information from labour studies, the sample
can be divided into diﬀerent groups of countries according to their private returns and
then estimate a separate macro return for each group. This is a natural way to pro-
ceed if micro and macro returns are correlated. This procedure has, in addition, the
advantage that it avoids relying too heavily on the numbers reported by Psacharopou-
los. Regression 4 shows the estimated macro returns for groups of countries with low,
moderate and high private returns10. The group with low and moderate private
returns display social returns respectively equal to 7.8% and 8.3%. These are not
statistically diﬀerent from the observed private returns for these groups (respectively
6.3% and 9.5%). By contrast, countries with high private returns have, paradoxically,
the lowest macro return. It is estimated at 4.9%,w h i c hi sa l m o s t10 percentage points
lower than their average private return. These results are summarised in table 5. One
possible interpretation for these ﬁndings is that in countries where the private return
on schooling is relatively high —for instance, due to important screening eﬀects— a
sub-optimally large share of the population goes to formal education. There is some
evidence in favour of the screening hypothesis for speciﬁc countries as surveyed by
Riley (2001). But the lack of more systematic evidence prevents exploring further
this hypothesis. On top of the paucity of evidence, this hypothesis does not say why
screening eﬀects are more important in some countries than in others.
The weighted average social Mincerian return for the three groups is 7.2% or
almost 3 percentage points lower than the average private return. Supposing that
Psacharopoulos data properly measure the marginal eﬀect of schooling on wages,
these results point to an absence of positive externalities of education. Moreover,
these ﬁndings show that there is no obvious relationship between micro and macro
10The thresholds are respectively returns up to 8%;f r o m8% to 11%,a n do v e r11%.returns. More speciﬁcally, countries with relatively large micro-returns have lower
than average macro returns.
Regarding the eﬀects of heterogeneity on the estimated average macro return,
table 4 provides mixed evidence. On the one hand, the point estimates that ignore
heterogeneity (regression 1) are identical to those that best acknowledge it (regression
4). This suggests that the heterogeneity in social Mincerian returns across countries
does not bias the estimated average return obtained when heterogeneity is ignored.
But on the other hand, the low Sargan statistic may be an indication that hetero-
geneity is in fact aﬀecting the estimates. Finally, it is important to highlight that
regardless of whether the average return is estimated with a bias or not, it seems that
return heterogeneity across countries is considerable. Thus even a good estimate of
the “world” average return on schooling may be misleading about the magnitude of
t h es o c i a lr e t u r ni ne a c hc o u n t r y .
4.2 Quality of education
One candidate to explain heterogeneity in social Mincerian returns across countries
is the quality of education. As noted above, Pritchett (2001) justify the lack of
signiﬁcance of schooling in cross-country growth regressions by the low quality of
education in developing countries. In similar regressions Hanushek and Kimko (2000)
ﬁnd that their indicators of education quality have a strong explanatory power for
growth. As they argue, one possible reason for the implausible large coeﬃcient on
quality that they ﬁnd is that quality determines the long-run income level.
To assess the eﬀect of quality qi on income levels we ﬁrst compute the simple
average of the two quality scores reported by Hanushek and Kimko (2000, pp. 1206-
1207) for each country available. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the
results the measure of quality is scaled to 1 for the country with the highest score inthe sample (Singapore). The qi values obtained in this way are shown in the appendix.
Then we can estimate the eﬀect of quality by multiplying qi by the number of years
of schooling. This approach assumes that quality and quantity can be substituted by
each other. On the other hand, multiplying the quality indicator by years of schooling
captures the notion that the productivity of schooling increases with quality11.U n d e r
















where γ is a measure of the weight of quality in the determination of the return on




Table 6 presents the main eﬀects of quality of education for diﬀerent values for γ.
The ﬁrst regression is the baseline estimation with the smaller sample of 67 countries
for which the data on education quality and years of schooling is available. In this
regression years of schooling is not weighted by quality (or equivalently γ =0 ).
There are no important diﬀerences with respect to the full-sample regression (see
regression 4 of table 3). Namely, the point estimate for the social Mincerian return is
virtually the same as before (8.4%). In regression 2, where γ =1 , the quality-weighted
level of schooling enters with a larger and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. The social
M i n c e r i a nr e t u r ni m p l i e di nr e g r e s s i o n2f o rac o u n t r yw i t hq =1is (1 − 0.632/1.632)×
0.164 = 0.1. Thus the sample average Mincerian return is simply 0.1 times the
average quality across countries. The resulting return is 6.6%, which implies that
neglecting education quality yields a return biased upwards by 1.8 points in this
particular speciﬁcation. Regressions 3 and 4 report the results for larger values of
11A similar function for human capital was previously used by Gundlach, Rudman and Wossmann
(2002).γ. As expected, the world average Mincerian return decreases as the importance of
quality is assumed to increase.
We can measure the diﬀerence between the social returns in table 6 and the pri-
vate returns reported by Psacharopoulos in order to obtain a crude assessment of the
externality to education in each country. The implicit externalities assuming γ =1
are shown in the appendix. In general, the high private returns observed in some
countries are not accompanied by equivalently large social returns. This is so be-
cause empirically countries with high private returns on education have lower levels
of quality (see ﬁgure 3) and a low quality implies a low macro Mincer coeﬃcient. As a
consequence the sample average of the macro Mincer coeﬃcient is 3 percentage points
lower than the private return.
One problem about the regressions 1-4 is that education quality is assumed to
aﬀect in a too speciﬁc way the return on schooling. Instead of multiplying quality by
years of schooling a more parsimonious representation may be obtained by splitting
the sample of countries according to their quality levels. Then a separate estimate can
be obtained for each group of countries. Such estimation has the advantage that it
does not need to specify how quality aﬀects the return on schooling. But on the other
hand, this approach has problems of its own since it supposes that all the countries
in a group have the same return. Ignoring this last caveat, regression 5 shows the
estimates when countries are split into three quality groups12.C o u n t r i e si nt h el o w
quality group have a low and non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on schooling. On the other
hand countries with “moderate” and “high” quality have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on
12The groups are formed by countries with quality lower than 0.45 (14 countries), between 0.45
and 0.67 (19 countries) and larger than 0.67 (34 countries). These thresholds were determined by
the ocurrence of important diﬀerences in quality levels between two consecutive countries (when
ranked by quality). This seems more reasonable and produced more sensible results than the option
of having groups with the same number of countries.years of schooling. The implicit Mincerian returns for these countries are respectively
8.7% and 9.8%. However these are likely to be upper bounds since the share of
physical capital is implausibly low in this regression. Note also that the Sargan
statistic increases signiﬁcantly, which may be an indication that regression 5 is dealing
better with heterogeneity than regressions 1-4. Finally, regression 6 groups together
countries with moderate and high quality of education. The coeﬃcient on the k/y
ratio is now signiﬁcant at a 10% level and the implicit share of physical capital raises
to 39%. This causes the Mincerian return of countries with better quality to fall to
7.5%.B u t t h e c o e ﬃcient on schooling is still highly signiﬁcant. By contrast, the
return for countries with low quality is 1.5% and is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
To summarise these ﬁndings, schooling quality appears an important determinant
of the social return on schooling. The results of table 6 show that ignoring quality
of schooling leads to an overestimation of the average macro Mincer coeﬃcient. The
magnitude of this overestimation depends on how quality enters in the regressions.
According to the regression 6, which yielded the largest Sargan test, this overestima-
tion is around 2 percentage points.
5 Conclusions
This paper has revisited the ﬁndings of earlier empirical studies on schooling and in-
come, a literature that has failed to ﬁnd a role for schooling as an input in a standard
production function. One particular issue that undermines the estimates of the coef-
ﬁcient on schooling in panel regressions is the collinearity between years of schooling
and physical capital stocks. It is shown that when problems of model speciﬁcation
are properly dealt with, years of schooling ﬁt well in a neoclassical production func-tion. In the borderline panel regression for 83 countries the coeﬃcient on schooling is
highly signiﬁcant and the point estimate for the macro Mincer return is 8.3%.T h i s
coeﬃcient must not be interpreted as an internal rate of return of schooling but as
the causal eﬀect of schooling on income per worker. With this caveat in mind the
estimates suggest the absence of externalities to education, which is consistent with
the ﬁndings based on wage regressions by Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996),
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) or Ciccone and Peri (2005). This is also consistent with
the macro regressions of Heckman and Klenow (1997) and Topel (1999).
This ﬁgure is an estimate of the cross-country average macro Mincer coeﬃcient.
However there seems to be substantial return heterogeneity across countries. Para-
doxically, countries where the micro Mincer coeﬃcients are relatively high display
on average a low and non signiﬁcant macro return. The other countries in the sam-
ple show social returns in line with the private ones. One possible explanation for
this is that screening eﬀects are pushing up the private returns on schooling in some
countries. This in turn will encourage workers with low ability to invest in formal
education. In this case high private returns on education may be accompanied with
low macro Mincer coeﬃcients. Labour studies, however, have not produced robust
evidence about this kind of eﬀects.
Paralleling these ﬁndings, schooling quality appears as a signiﬁcant determinant
of disparities in the social return on schooling across countries. The eﬀect of quality
depends on how it enters in the regressions. For instance, when the quality score
multiplies the number of years of schooling the average social return falls to 6.6%.
Under this setup the country with the highest quality in the sample (Singapore) has a
social return on schooling equal to 10%, whereas in the country with the lowest quality
(Iran) the macro Mincer coeﬃcient is only 3%. If instead of explicitly including the
quality score in the regressions countries are grouped according to their quality levelsand a separate return is estimated for each group, similar results emerge. More
speciﬁcally, the return in a group of countries with low schooling quality is virtually
equal to zero. In countries with moderate and high levels of quality the average return
is 7.5%. The average return for all three groups of counties obtained in this way is
6.2%.
The previous results show that when return heterogeneity is not taken into ac-
count in these regressions the average Mincer return is estimated with a positive bias
of about 2 percentage points. Another implication of the results found here is that
income accounting exercises that use micro Mincer returns to build aggregate hu-
man capital stocks may be seriously underestimating the role of human capital in
explaining income diﬀerences across countries. For instance Hall and Jones (1999)
assume a piecewise linear Mincerian return, which is decreasing in the number of
y e a r so fs c h o o l i n g . T h i sl e a d st h e mt oﬁnd that human capital in India is 45.4% of
the US level in 1988. Caselli (2005) assumes a similar human capital function and not
surprisingly obtains similar conclusions. Although he acknowledges that the human
capital gap between rich and poor countries may be higher due to diﬀerences in qual-
ity he does not try to redo the calculations. The importance of taking into account
the quality of education in income accounting has already been raised by Gundlach,
Rudman and Wossmann (2002) and Wossmann (2003). With the estimates of table
6 —where a country like India gets a much lower Mincerian return than the US— the
ratio of human capital in India to the US falls to 25% to 30%. So this paper provides
empirical support for quality as a determinant of income disparities.
This leads us to the question of what allows countries to improve schooling attain-
ment and schooling quality. Most empirical studies try to ﬁn do u tw h a tt h ei n c o m e
elasticity to schooling is. But this provides precious little guidance on the policies that
may lead to higher levels of educational outcomes. One interesting line of research isthe role of health and life expectancy in the private decisions on schooling investment.
In this respect, the theoretical works of Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2001)
and of Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000), where increases in life expectancy raise
investment in human capital are an important step ahead. Complementary empirical
studies on this ﬁeld would help to back this hypothesis.6 References
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The fading effect of schooling on growth 




















Observations  292 290 230 230 230  230 
∆St  0.086 0.058 0.081 0.093 0.028  0.008 
  (0.024)  (2.15)  (0.036) (0.041) (0.023)  (0.022) 
St-1  0.004 0.009 0.003 0.003 1.6e-3 2.4e-4 
 (0.001)  (2.35)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.6e-3)  6.7e-4) 
ln(yt-1) -0.005  -0.050  -0.005  -0.006 -0.004  -0.016 
  (0.003)  (6.45)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.004) 
∆ln(kit)       0.574  0.607 
       (0.042)  (0.041) 
ln(kit-1)        0.011 
        (0.003) 
R
2  0.284 0.481 0.268 0.287 0.634  0.666 
         
Notes: Time dummies included (not reported). Columns (1) and (2) are from Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and Topel 
(1999), respectively. OLS estimates, except for Topel, who reports fixed-effect estimates. Standard errors in 
parenthesis, except for Topel who reports t-statistics. 10-year observations for the period 1960-1990. Variables in 
changes are annualised. yit is GDP per capita or per worker, from Summers and Heston, PWT 5.6; Sit is years of 
schooling from Barro and Lee (1993) in columns (1) and (2) and from Cohen and Soto (2001) in columns (3) to (6); 
kit is stock of physical capital per worker from Easterly and Levine (2001). 
 Table 2 
The effect of schooling in a standard production function 
Dependent variable is ln(yit) 
 
















Observations 313  230 313 230 313 
Log(kit) 0.604
 a 0.585




  (0.047)  (0.043) (0.140) (0.171) (0.132) 
Sit 0.010  0.024  0.033  -0.046  -0.016 
  (0.018)  (0.022) (0.059) (0.108) (0.056) 
Sargan (p-values)  −  −  0.183 0.219 0.399 
2
nd order serial 
correl. (p-values) 
−  −  −  0.551 0.819 
 
 
















Observations 313  230 313 230 313 
Sit 0.249





  (0.018)  (0.041) (0.031) (0.169) (0.031) 
Sargan (p-values)  −  −  0.795 0.015 0.061 
2
nd order serial 
correl. (p-values) 
−  −  −  0.027 0.823 
Notes: 10-year observations for the period 1960-1990. yit is GDP per worker, from Summers and Heston, PWT 5.6; 
Sit is years of schooling from Cohen and Soto (2001); kit is stock of physical capital per worker from Easterly and 
Levine (2001). Time dummies included (not reported). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 2-step results for GMM 
estimates.  
In the current GMM estimation, the first stage treats each period as a different cross section. For the equation in levels 
the instruments are: for 1960, a constant; for 1970 a constant; for 1980, a constant and one period lagged first-
differences of explanatory variables; for 1990 a constant and one and two period lagged first-differences of 
explanatory variables. For the equation in first-differences the instruments are: for 1970 a constant; for 1980, a 
constant and two period lagged levels of explanatory variables; for 1990 a constant and two and three period lagged 
levels of explanatory variables. This means that there are respectively 10, 9 and 16 different instruments for the 
equation in levels, in first differences and in a system of levels and differences (Panel A). 
a, b, c: coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Table 3 
The effect of schooling after dealing with collinearity 
 













(4) - Baseline 
Observations 313  230  313  313 
Log(k/y)it 0.221
 b -0.213
 b 0.865 
b 0.859 
b 
 (0.112)  (0.105)  (0.422)  (0.349) 
Sit 0.217
 a 0.093
 b 0.150 
b 0.155
 a 
 (0.024)  (0.044)  (0.064)  (0.054) 
Implicit α  0.181 -0.271 0.464 0.462 
Mincerian return  0.178 0.118 0.080 0.083 
Sargan (p-values)  −  −  0.363 0.176 
2
nd order serial correl. 
(p-values) 
−  −  −  0.804 
Notes: 10-year observations for the period 1960-1990. yit is GDP per worker, from Summers and Heston, PWT 5.6; 
Sit is years of schooling from Cohen and Soto (2001); kit is stock of physical capital per worker from Easterly and 
Levine (2001). Time dummies included (not reported). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 2-step GMM 
coefficients (one-step standard errors). See note to table 2 about the selection of instruments for GMM estimation. 
a, b, c: coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Table 4 
Accounting for Heterogeneity of Mincerian Returns 
 
Dependent variable is ln(yit) 








Observations  214 214 210 214 
ln(k/y)it  0.928 
b 0.976
 b 0.904 
b 0.661 
c 
  (0.432) (0.405) (0.434) (0.347) 
Sit  0.139
 a 0.089
 c 0.094 
c  
 (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.054)   
Excess private return ×  Sit   -0.612 
a -0.651   
   (0.196)  (0.449)  
Sit (Low priv. return)      0.129
 a 
       (0.040) 
Sit (Moderate priv. return)      0.138
 a 
      (0.050) 
Sit (High priv. return)      0.082 
       (0.056) 
Implicit α  0.481 0.494 0.475 0.398 
Social Mincerian Return  0.072 0.045 0.049 0.072 
Sargan  (p-values)  0.016 0.041 0.027 0.073 
2
nd order serial correl. (p-values)  0.616  0.716  0.534  0.713 
Notes: 10-year observations for the period 1960-1990. yit is GDP per worker, from Summers and Heston, PWT 5.6; 
Sit is years of schooling from Cohen and Soto (2001); kit is stock of physical capital per worker from Easterly and 
Levine (2001). Excess private returns from Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002). 
Regression 3 excludes Jamaica. Time dummies included (not reported). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 2-step 
GMM coefficients (one-step standard errors). See note to table 2 about the selection of instruments for GMM 
estimation. 
a, b, c: coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Table 5 
Mincerian returns by group of countries 
 
Private return  Countries  Average private 
return 
Social return 
Up to 0.08  17 0.063  0.078 
Between 0.08 and 0.11 22  0.095  0.083 
Higher than 0.11 16  0.147  0.049 
Private returns from Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002).  Table 6 
The effects of quality of education 
 
Dependent variable is ln(yit) 
(System GMM estimation) 
 
 (1) 
γ = 0 
(2) 
γ = 1 
(3) 
γ = 3 
(4) 





Observations  257 257 257 257 257 257 
ln(k/y)it  0.726 
c 0.632  0.575 0.934 
b 0.406 0.643 
c 
  (0.416) (0.433) (0.424) (0.386) (0.381) (0.361) 
q
γ Sit  0.145
 b 0.164 
a 0.178 
a 0.168 
a    
  (0.057) (0.050) (0.046) (0.054)     
Sit (Low q)       0.011  0.024 
       (0.080)  (0.072) 
Sit (Moderate q)       0.122 
c  
       (0.064)   
Sit (High q)       0.138 
a  
       (0.045)   
Sit (Mode. & high q)        0.123 
b 
        (0.052) 
Implicit α  0.421 0.387 0.363 0.483 0.289 0.391 
Average Mincerian 
return 
0.084 0.066 0.040 0.010 0.076 0.062 
Mincerian return for 
country  with q = 1 
0.084 0.100 0.113 0.087 0.098 0.075 
Sargan  (p-values)  0.084 0.082 0.105 0.076    0.156 0.177 
2
nd order serial correl. 
(p-values) 
0.683 0.647 0.610 0.547 0.599 0.636 
Notes: 10-year observations for the period 1960-1990. yit is GDP per worker, from Summers and Heston, PWT 5.6; 
Sit is years of schooling from Cohen and Soto (2001); kit is stock of physical capital per worker from Easterly and 
Levine (2001); q is the quality score of a country relative to the score of Singapore (from Hanushek and Kimko 
(2000)). Time dummies included (not reported). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 2-step GMM coefficients (one-
step standard errors). See note to table 2 about the selection of instruments for GMM estimation. 
a, b, c: coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Algeria 3.25 1.64 0.044 0.438
Argentina 7.03 0.39 0.103 0.071 -0.032 0.711
Australia 11.45 1.28 0.067 0.083 0.016 0.833
Austria 9.70 1.03 0.094 0.085 -0.009 0.854
Bangladesh 2.43 0.16
Belgium 8.74 0.99 0.086 0.858
Benin 0.91 0.29
Bolivia 5.39 1.96 0.089 0.039 -0.050 0.385
Brazil 4.39 1.71 0.147 0.055 -0.092 0.548
Burkina Faso 0.21 0.02 0.096
Burundi 0.92 0.02
Cameroon 3.00 0.80 0.063 0.632
Canada 10.86 1.51 0.071 0.079 0.009 0.794
Central African Republic 1.41 0.34 0.039 0.385
Chile 7.64 1.24 0.120 0.040 -0.080 0.397
China 4.09 0.64 0.086 0.096 0.010 0.962
Colombia 4.73 0.74 0.140 0.056 -0.084 0.565
Costa Rica 4.44 0.98 0.097 0.069 -0.028 0.686
Cote d’Ivoire 1.50 0.63 0.201
Cyprus 6.75 0.84 0.081 0.069 -0.012 0.688
Denmark 10.43 0.88 0.045
Dominican Republic 3.75 0.74 0.094 0.060 -0.034 0.597
Ecuador 5.73 1.22 0.118 0.058 -0.060 0.581
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.63 2.28 0.052 0.041 -0.011 0.408
El Salvador 3.17 0.94 0.087 0.037 -0.049 0.373
Ethiopia 0.28 0.03 0.080
Fiji 6.22 1.00 0.084 0.840
Finland 8.76 2.17 0.082 0.084 0.002 0.842
France 8.61 1.87 0.100 0.086 -0.014 0.856
Gabon 3.53 0.89
Ghana 3.56 1.29 0.078 0.040 -0.038 0.398
Greece 7.28 1.08 0.052 0.078 0.026 0.777
Guatemala 2.53 0.78 0.149
Guyana 6.26 0.89 0.076 0.756
Honduras 3.51 1.06 0.135 0.043 -0.092 0.428
India 2.22 0.55 0.078 0.033 -0.045 0.330
Indonesia 4.22 1.69 0.120 0.063 -0.057 0.629
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2.04 1.39 0.116 0.030 -0.086 0.304
Iraq 1.43 0.89 0.044 0.442
Ireland 8.43 0.76 0.076 0.760
Italy 7.42 1.52 0.025 0.073 0.048 0.731
Jamaica 6.48 1.61 0.288 0.072 -0.216 0.721
Japan 10.75 0.84 0.099 0.098 0.000 0.981
Jordan 6.14 6.37 0.063 0.635
Kenya 3.48 1.61 0.162 0.042 -0.120 0.421
Korea, Rep. 7.98 5.19 0.121 0.089 -0.031 0.892
Madagascar 2.18 0.36
Malawi 2.49 0.23














Mauritius 4.93 2.17 0.081 0.812
Mexico 5.46 1.31 0.109 0.056 -0.052 0.562
Morocco 1.37 0.46 0.158
Mozambique 1.28 0.28 0.041 0.406
Netherlands 9.67 0.84 0.069 0.088 0.019 0.880
New Zealand 10.15 0.63 0.093 0.929
Nicaragua 3.52 1.41 0.109 0.040 -0.069 0.400
Nigeria 1.59 0.36 0.057 0.568
Norway 10.81 1.55 0.055 0.089 0.034 0.887
Panama 6.14 1.68 0.137 0.069 -0.068 0.690
Paraguay 4.94 0.52 0.115 0.061 -0.054 0.606
Peru 5.84 1.45 0.081 0.061 -0.020 0.614
Philippines 5.79 1.04 0.103 0.053 -0.050 0.528
Portugal 4.69 1.24 0.093 0.069 -0.024 0.686
Senegal 1.24 0.30
Sierra Leone 1.94 0.53
Singapore 6.23 0.34 0.133 0.100 -0.033 1.000
South Africa 4.98 0.24 0.041 0.075 0.034 0.751
Spain 7.05 0.99 0.072 0.079 0.007 0.788
Sweden 10.49 1.63 0.059 0.081 0.023 0.815
Switzerland 12.05 0.56 0.077 0.092 0.015 0.921
Syrian Arab Republic 4.27 1.21 0.048 0.481
Thailand 4.03 2.23 0.110 0.067 -0.043 0.669
Trinidad and Tobago 7.92 0.96 0.068 0.676
Tunisia 2.54 0.52 0.080 0.064 -0.016 0.640
Turkey 3.65 1.34 0.063 0.632
Uganda 1.93 0.24
United Kingdom 10.82 1.46 0.068 0.091 0.023 0.906
United States 11.56 0.88 0.099 0.070 -0.029 0.701
Uruguay 6.47 0.78 0.097 0.077 -0.020 0.766
Venezuela, RB 4.96 1.52 0.089 0.059 -0.030 0.590
Zambia 4.29 0.85 0.052 0.522
Zimbabwe 5.05 1.75 0.059 0.588
Countries 83 83 55 67 49 67
Mean 5.230 1.131 0.100 0.066 -0.031 0.660
Standard Deviation 3.123 0.958 0.042 0.018 0.047 0.182